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time of his death, was valued at approx-
imately $750,000. Inventories were med 
showing $425,000 in real property, $2,500 
in tangible personal property and $324,000 
in intangible personal property including 
stocks, bonds and bank accounts. 
Miriam E. Emmert was the designated 
personal representative of her father's 
estate. In this capacity, she filed a petition 
for declaratory relief in the Circuit Court 
for Carroll County. The petition alleged, 
among other things, that the phrase "per-
sonal property was ambiguous; that the 
testator's intention was to include only 
tangible personal property ... " Emmert '0. 
Hearn, 309 Md. at 21, 522 A.2d 377. 
The trial court concluded that a latent 
ambiguity existed as to whether the "per-
sonal property" referred to in the second 
provision of Roberts' will included tangi-
ble, as well as intangible, personal proper-
ty. Extrinsic evidence, including testimony 
by Emmert, one of the testator's children, 
and the deposition by the attorney who 
drafted the will, was admitted to "clear the 
ambiguity." Id. at 22, 522 A.2d at 379. 
From this testimony, it was gleaned that 
the intention of the testator was to include 
only tangible personal property in his 
second provision. The court held that the 
words "personal property," as used in the 
second provision of his will, applied to tan-
gible property only, and that the intangi-
ble personal property passed under 
another provision of the will into the inter 
vivos trust. 
In an unreported opinion, the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland reversed the 
circuit court judgment. It found that no 
ambiguity existed as to the words of the 
will; therefore, extrinsic evidence as to the 
intention of the testator should not have 
been permitted. According to the court of 
special appeals, the trial court was in error 
in admitting extrinsic evidence of the testa-
tor's intention. Certiorari was granted by 
the court of appeals to consider the impor-
tant question presented 307 Md. 163 
(1986). 
Upon review, the court of appeals 
applied a step-by-step analysis in constru-
ing the will. Ordinarily, the court said, the 
intent of a testator must be gathered from 
the four corners of the will, giving words 
their "plain meaning." In so doing, the 
court recognized that their foremost con-
cern was to ascertain the testator's express-
ed intent. However, the court stressed that 
"[e]xtrinsic evidence should not be admit-
ted to show that the testator meant some-
thing different from what his language 
imports .. , What he meant to say must be 
gathered from what he did say." Id. (quot-
ing Fersinger '0. Martin, 183 Md. 135, 138, 
36 A.2d 716 (1944». 
The court then looked to Webster's Dic-
tionary, as well as Black's Law Dictionary, 
to determine both the ordinary and the 
legal meaning of the term "personal prop-
erty." Both sources included intangible 
property in their definitions. Additionally, 
the court noted that bequests of personal 
property are generally to be construed 
broadly unless there is some indication in 
the will to the contrary. The court cited 
several cases where it had applied this gen-
eral rule. 
In Leroy '0. Kirk, 262 Md. 276, 283, 277 
A.2d 611 (1971), for example, the testator 
bequeathed "all of my personal property, 
including my automobile, boat and the 
contents of my house and outbuild-
ings .... " The listing of items put a restric-
tion on the term "personal property" and 
caused the court to limit, by example, the 
bequest to tangible personal property. 
Returning to the Roberts' will, the court 
found that nothing on the face of the will 
limited or qualified the bequest of personal 
property. No examples were given in the 
will for the purpose of illustration as to 
what the testator meant by personal prop-
erty. The court concluded that the will 
was unambiguous on its face. Further-
more, the court stated that a latent ambi-
guity did not exist in the provisions of the 
Roberts' will. H "the language of the will 
is plain and single, yet is found to apply 
equally to two or more subjct or objects 
then it would indicate latent ambiguity." 
Emmert, 309 Md. at 27,522 A.2d 377, 381. 
Extrinsic evidence would be admissible 
only to resolve an ambiguity. Id. Such 
extrinsic evidence might also indicate that 
the description in the will is defective. 
The court stated that there was no defec-
tive description in the will nor was there 
any indication that Roberts' bequest 
applied to two or more persons or things. 
Thus, "if the language of a will is clear 
and no latent ambiguity exists, the court's 
role in the construction of the will is at an 
end." Id. at 28, 522 A.2d at 382. There 
being no indication that the testator 
intended anything other than all of his per-
sonal property to pass under the second 
provision, the court held that the bequest 
in that paragraph was all-inclusive. 
The court cautioned that its holding 
would yield an unfair result to the grand-
children, especially to the son of the 
deceased child, but such "[A]n inequality 
cannot influence a court in its duty to find 
out what a testator meant by his will .... " 
Emmert, 309 Md. at 28, 522 A.2d 377 
. (quoting McCurdy '0. Safe Deposit & Trust 
Co., 190 Md. 67, 69, 57 A.2d 302, 303 
(1948». 
By its holding the court has once more 
underscored the important of specificity in 
the drafting of legal documents. Drafters 
of wills and other testamentary devices 
will take note to be as specific as possible 
in putting into words the true intentions of 
their clients. 
- )fargaret Ann Willis 
Allstate Insurance Company '0. Atwood: 
INSURER BOUND BY VERDICT IN 
TORT ACTION AND COULD NOT 
RELITIGATE SAME ISSUES AND 
OBTAIN AN OVERRIDING 
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ON 
JURY'S VERDICT 
In Allstate Ins. Co. '0. Atwood, 71 Md. 
App. 107, 523 A.2d 1066 (1987), the Court 
of Special Appeals of Maryland held that a 
tort-feasor's insurer, which provided 
defense for the tort-feasor in an action 
brought by the victim, in which the jury 
determined that the defendant's striking of 
the victim was the result of negligence 
rather than battery, was bound by the ver-
dict even though it was not a party to the 
suit. As a result, the insurer could not seek 
post verdict declaratory relief on the same 
issues of fact which has been decided in the 
tort-feasor's trial. 
This case stems from an incident which 
occured in 1983. In an apparently 
unprovoked attack, the insured, John 
Atwood, struck another youth in the face. 
The suit was brought by the victim, indivi-
dually and through his father, against 
Atwood in the Circuit Court for Mont-
gomery County. The complaint alleged 
that the plaintiff's injuries were the result 
of either Atwood's negligence or inten-
tional assault and battery. 
Atwood, who was living with his 
parents at the time of the incident, relied 
on their policy with Allstate Insurance 
Company. The exclusionary clause pr<r 
vided that the insurer is not liable for 
"bodily injury ... intentionally caused by 
an insured person." Id. at 108, 523 A.2d at 
1067. 
Before the trial, believing Atwood's 
striking of the victim was intentional and 
thereby excluded from coverage, Allstate 
filed for declaratory relief in 1984. The Bill 
was dismissed on the grounds that it was 
premature. 
At the trial, the jury found that Atwood 
was negligent which prevented the defen-
dant's conduct from coming within the 
policy's exclusion regarding intentional 
conduct. Despite the jury's finding of 
negligence, Allstate filed for a Bill of 
Declaratory Relief on the ground that the 
. injuries sustained by the plaintiff "were a 
direct result ... of (Atwood's) intentional 
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act." Id. After both parties successfully had 
the motion dismissed, Allstate appealed. 
Writing for the majority in the Court of 
Special Appeals of Maryland, Chief Judge 
Gilbert found the vexing issue presented 
by this case to be: "whether an insurer 
may. .. after disposition of the tort mat-
ter, relitigate the same issues and obtain a 
declaratory judgment... that overrides 
the jury's verdict on the tort action." Id. 
The court found that even though Allstate 
was not a party to the tort action, it is nev-
ertheless bound by the jury's verdict. 
The court cited Brohawn 'Cl. Tran· 
samerica Ins. Co., 276 Md. 396, 347 A.2d 
854 (1975) as being similar with respect to 
the conflict between an insurer and an 
insured. The conflict in Brohawn arose out 
of a complaint that alleged separate and 
alternative theories of negligence and 
assault and battery. The insurer insisted 
because of the conflicting legal theories 
averred against its insured, the extent of 
policy coverage (due to an exclusionary 
clause similar to the case here) should be 
resolved prior to trial in a declaratory 
action. Although the Brohawn court 
noted, as did the court here, that the above 
contention is not without merit, it held 
that a declaratory action is inappropriate 
where the questions of fact to be resolved 
in the declaratory action are also to be liti-
gated in the pending action. Id. 
The court, in its application of Brohawn, 
found that while an insurer's right to pre-
liminary adjudication on an insured's right 
to coverage under an insurance policy is 
limited, it is not a compelling enough 
reason to allow an insurer to adjudicate 
issues that will be subsequently litigated at 
trial. Allstate, 71 Md. App. at 1069, 523 
A2d. at 1069. 
The court further pointed out that 
Brohawn as applied did not strip away all 
of Allstate's defenses. To begin, the court 
refused to read Brohawn as a bar to an 
insurance carrier's ability to be a party to 
the action. Nothing in the cited authority 
forbids the carrier, after supplying inde-
pendent counsel to its insured or paying 
the cost of the insured's choice of counsel, 
from intervening as a party and from being 
represented at a tort trial. 
Thus, to limit the more severe implica-
tions of this holding, the court placed the 
locus of the blame on Allstate for its fail-
ure to intervene, not on Allstate being 
denied its right to representation. 
The court in AtUlood clearly indicates 
that a more affirmative role should be 
played by the insurance carrier in tort liti-
gation in which a plaintiff pleads alter-
native legal theories of which one will be 
excluded by the scope of the policy at trial. 
Implicitly the court held firm in its unwil 
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lingness to compromise a jury verdict on 
an issue of liability, despite the fact that 
extrinsic evidence may reveal that the 
jury's finding may well fall into an 
insurance carrier's exclusionary' provision. 
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